NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



19991126 081

THESIS

THE NAVY'S "MOMENT OF TRUTH":
AN ANALYSIS OF RECRUIT EXPERIENCES

AND OUTCOMES

by

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September 1999

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE	Form Approved		
	OMB No. 0704-		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for re gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regar collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Director Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwo	ding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this		
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND I			
September 1999 M	aster's Thesis		
	5. FUNDING NUMBERS		
6. AUTHOR(S)			
Selena A. Hernandez-Haines			
	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION		
Naval Postgraduate School	REPORT NUMBER		
Monterey, CA 93943-5000			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not ref	lect the official policy or		
position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.	1		
	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE		
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	120. DISTRIBUTION CODE		
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)			
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results indicate that "Moment of Truth" recruits ha	ave a higher rate of		
discharge than do other Navy recruits after two	and six months of		
service.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS	15. NUMBER OF PAGES		
Recruits, "Moment of Truth," early attrition, pre-service criminal history	y, 94		

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Unclassified

drug use.

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18, 298-102

UL

16. PRICE CODE

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT

Unclassified

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

THE NAVY'S "MOMENT OF TRUTH": AN ANALYSIS OF RECRUIT EXPERIENCES AND OUTCOMES

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 1999

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ABSTRACT

Each year, thousands of recruits reveal one or more questionable events in their past during the "Moment of Truth," which occurs on the first full day of boot camp at the Navy's Recruit Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois. This thesis examines the nature of these revelations and their outcomes. The records of 8,076 "Moment of Truth" recruits from Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999 are analyzed with respect to demographics, nature of admission (legal, medical, etc.), and disposition of the recruit (retained, waivered, discharged, etc.). The data for retained "Moment of Truth" recruits were matched with the Defense Manpower Data Center's Enlisted Master File to determine whether these recruits subsequently became early losses and, if so, under what discharge code. Discharge rates and loss categories were then compared with those of all recruits during the same years. The results indicate that "Moment of Truth" recruits have a higher rate of discharge than do other Navy recruits after two and six months of service.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTE	RODUCTION 1
	A.	BACKGROUND 1
	B.	PURPOSE 2
	C.	SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 5
	D.	ORGANIZATION 6
II.	"MOM	ENT OF TRUTH" HISTORY AND OBSERVATIONS FROM A
	VISI	T TO THE RECRUIT QUALITY ASSURANCE TEAM (RQAT)7
	A.	CHAPTER OVERVIEW 7
	B.	THE RECRUIT QUALITY ASSURANCE TEAM AND THE
		"MOMENT OF TRUTH" 7
	C.	SELECTED OBSERVATIONS FROM SITE VISIT TO
		THE RQAT 15
III.	LITE	RATURE REVIEW25
	A.	THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF FIRST-TERM ATTRITION25
	B.	FIRST-TERM ATTRITION RESEARCH RELEVANT TO THE
		"MOMENT OF TRUTH" 27
	C.	IMPLICATIONS OF THE ATTRITION STUDIES FOR
		"MOMENT OF TRUTH" RECRUITS 31
IV.	METH	ODOLOGY AND DATA33
	A.	THE RQAT DATA SETS
	B.	DESCRIPTIONS OF THE VARIABLES
	C.	THE FY 1998 AND FY 1999 NAVY ENLISTED ACCESSION
		COHORT DATA SETS
V.	DATA	ANALYSIS 39
	A.	CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FY 1998 AND FY 1999
		RQAT DATA SETS

B. "MOMENT OF	TRUTH" RECRUIT CATEGORIES 46
C. COMPARISON	OF SEPARATION RATES AND INTER-SERVICE
SEPARATION	CODES OF "MOMENT OF TRUTH" RECRUITS
AND ALL RE	CRUITS 56
VI SUMMARY, CONCLU	SIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS61
A. SUMMARY	61
B. CONCLUSION	S
C. RECOMMENDA	rions65
APPENDIX A. INTER-SE	RVICE SEPARATION CODES
APPENDIX B. ENLISTME	NT WAIVER CODES71
APPENDIX C. INTER-SE	RVICE SEPARATION CODE GROUPINGS 73
LIST OF REFERENCES	
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION	LIST 79

LIST OF TABLES

1.	Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes13
2.	Selected Characteristics of Recruits: Variable Name and Description
3.	Inter-service Separation Code (ISC) Groupings37
4.	Gender Composition of FY 1998 and FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits During Corresponding Periods, FY 1998 - 199940
5.	Racial/Ethnic Background of "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits, FY 199841
6.	Racial/Ethnic Background of "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits, FY 199941
7.	AFQT Categories of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits42
8.	AFQT Categories of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits42
9.	Education Level of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits43
10.	Education Level of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits43
11.	Entry Age of FY 1998 and FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits During Corresponding Periods, FY 1998 - FY 199944
12.	Waiver Status of FY 1998 and FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits During Corresponding Periods, FY 1998 - FY 1999

13.	Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes46
14.	Gender Distribution of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes47
15.	Gender Distribution of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes48
16.	Racial/Ethnic Distribution of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes49
17.	Racial/Ethnic Distribution of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes50
18.	AFQT Category Distribution of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes51
19.	AFQT Category Distribution of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes51
20.	Education Level of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes
21.	Education Level of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes
22.	Racial/Ethnic Distribution of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes53
23.	Waiver Status of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Code
24.	Distribution of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruit by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (ROAT) Action Codes/Offense Categories

25.	(MOT) Recruit Distribution by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes/Offense Categories
26.	Active Duty Status of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits After Two Months of Service
27.	Active Duty Status of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" Recruits and All Navy Recruits After Six Months of Service
28.	Active Duty Status of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" Recruits and All Navy Recruits After Two Months of Service59

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank several individuals for their invaluable assistance and contributions to this thesis.

Dr. Eli Flyer provided the idea for the study, and gave me important points of contact. Mr. William King of the Defense Manpower Data Center provided essential assistance in procuring and "crunching" the data. Without him, this thesis would not have been possible. Dr. Mark Eitelberg provided not only his expertise, but moral support in the eleventh hour(s), of which there were a few. Professor Alice Crawford provided insightful editing for the layperson and helped me say what I really meant. The Recruit Quality Assurance Team, Great Lakes, Illinois, were superb hosts and introduced me to the human faces of the "Moment of Truth."

To my husband Dave and my daughter Angelina, this is "Mom's book." Thanks for understanding.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

On the eve of the 21st century, the Navy continues to strive for efficiencies in both the technological and manpower arenas. Technological advances proceed apace, but manpower problems remain. In 1998 the Navy fell more than 7,000 recruits short of its goal, while the loss rate of enlisted personnel failing to complete their initial term of service continued to hover in the 30-percent region as it has for at least 20 years (GAO/Gebicke, March 12, 1998, p. 23). This early loss of personnel, called "attrition," is an expensive phenomenon not only in terms of dollars, but also in manpower shortages for the fleet, which can affect operational readiness and morale.

The majority of today's recruits are high school graduates with above-average scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) (OASD, 1997, p. 2-14; OASD, 1998, p. 3-10; DoD DefenseLINK, October 1998). The recruitment drought of recent years, however, has prompted the Navy to accept relatively more non-high school graduates than in the recent past, though still remaining within the Department of Defense (DoD) recruit quality standards of 90 percent high school graduates. Some otherwise-qualified

recruits can enter naval service with waivers for certain medical conditions, pre-service criminal history, or self-admitted drug or alcohol misuse.

Although standards exist to control the granting of waivers, an uncertain number of technically-unqualified recruits slip through the system and enter the Navy (GAO, January 6, 1997; Flyer, 1995; Frabutt, 1996). Some of these recruits will later be identified, while others will never be found out. Every unqualified recruit who evades detection, only to later become a personnel loss, costs the Navy in money, time, and readiness.

Of course, other recruits who are waivered according to procedure may become early losses anyway. Refining the current screening procedures to better identify poor waiver risks could help remove these likely attrition candidates before a great deal of Navy money and time has been spent. Although recruiters and entrance processing stations have the first opportunities to screen and waiver recruits, the Navy Recruit Training Center (RTC) in Great Lakes, Illinois also plays a vital role in weeding out unsuitable recruits before they reach the fleet.

B. PURPOSE

As part of its enlistment screening system, the Navy has used, since 1992, a so-called "Moment of Truth" at its

basic recruit training, or "boot camp," at RTC Great Lakes. The program is conducted by Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) Career Recruiting Force personnel assigned to the Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT). The RQAT "Moment of Truth" occurs on the first full day of boot camp, when groups of recruits are informed by the ROAT of the military punishment for concealing information such as arrests, convictions, drug abuse, or medical conditions that might, if known to the Navy, disqualify the recruits from enlisting. The recruits are then given an opportunity to review their enlistment records for correctness and to speak in private with a Navy representative about any questionable event or condition in their past. Following this interview, a determination is made whether to continue the recruit's training, seek a waiver or further information, or discharge the individual.

Each year, thousands of recruits reveal a possible problem during the "Moment of Truth." For example, more than 5,700 recruits raised their hand in Fiscal Year (FY) 1998, while in the first six months of FY 1999, 3,655 recruits did so (RQAT Deputy Director, interview, July 1999). Although the RQAT submits a variety of regular reports to CNRC, to date, no comprehensive study has been conducted regarding the nature of recruit admissions or the

demographics of the recruits involved. Further, no information can be found concerning the fate of recruits who continue with training: do they typically succeed, or do they tend to become early losses?

Better understanding of the information elicited during the "Moment of Truth" will allow more cost-effective decisions to be made when considering whether to retain or discharge a recruit who presents previously concealed disqualifying information. Such understanding may also help recruiters and MEPS personnel be aware of types of commonly withheld information that might be brought forth earlier with more focused attention.

This thesis examines data on "Moment of Truth" recruits to answer the following research questions:

- 1. What do recruits admit at the "Moment of Truth?"

 Are there more medical, prior criminal history, or

 drug/alcohol-related admissions?
- 2. What action is taken on "Moment of Truth" recruits? For each category of offense, what percentage of recruits are discharged or allowed to continue? What are the demographics, education level, and AFQT categories of those who are allowed to continue and those who are not?

- 3. Based on the above, is there a pattern to the demographics or qualifications of typical "Moment of Truth" recruits, to the type of admission they make, or to their discharge or continuation?
- 4. How likely are "Moment of Truth" recruits to become early losses (within the first 6 months of service)?

C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis examines 8,076 records of "Moment of Truth" admissions from FY 1998 and FY 1999. The demographics of the recruits and the types of admissions (legal, medical, etc.) are examined using RQAT categories, which are fully described in Chapter II. Recruits who were allowed to continue training are identified in the Navy Active Duty Enlisted Master File using Social Security Number (SSN) matching. The matched records of these "Moment of Truth" "survivors" were then located in the most current Enlisted Master File date available (July 31, 1999) to see whether they were subsequently discharged, and, if so, with what Inter-Service Separation Code (ISC). The ISCs were placed in logical groupings to reduce the 105 possible codes to 7 categories such as Medical, Legal, Performance, etc. (see Appendix C). Finally, the recruit characteristics and discharge codes of the "Moment of Truth" data sets were

compared to those of the total Navy enlisted cohorts for FY 1998 and the first half of FY 1999.

D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter II discusses the history and present administration of the "Moment of Truth," and provides background based on observations from a visit to the RQAT. Chapter III reviews prior research on unsuitability attrition. Chapter IV describes the original RTC data set and the merged RTC-Enlisted Master File data set, as well as the analytical methods used in the study. Chapter V presents the results of the data analysis. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the results, offers conclusions, and provides recommendations based on the findings of this thesis.

II. "MOMENT OF TRUTH" HISTORY AND OBSERVATIONS FROM A VISIT TO THE ROAT

A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This chapter provides the history and present operating procedures of the Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT), which conducts the sessions informally known as the "Moment of Truth." This information is compiled from discussions with RQAT team members, due to lack of a formal historical record and non-availability of the RQAT guiding instruction, COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1137.1C, which is presently under revision. Also included is a synopsis of the author's observations during a two-day visit to RTC Great Lakes to observe the RQAT in action is also included.

B. THE RECRUIT QUALITY ASSURANCE TEAM AND THE "MOMENT OF TRUTH"

In 1992, Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) established the RQAT in response to complaints from Navy commands about recruits who arrived at their initial duty stations with serious, undetected problems. These included a history of drug or alcohol abuse, pending civilian legal entanglements, and disqualifying or troublesome medical conditions. The RQAT was to serve as an additional screening device to quickly identify unsuitable or questionably qualified recruits. The RQAT program was

commonly called the "Moment of Truth" because of the intense pressure placed on recruits to reveal any concealed problems or "face the consequences." The RQAT's official mission statement is as follows:

MISSION STATEMENT (RECRUIT QUALITY ASSURANCE TEAM)

The mission of RQAT is to perform a final Navy Recruiting Command quality assurance check to ensure Recruit Training Command receives recruits who are qualified for enlistment and eligible to begin recruit training. Promoting honesty and personal responsibility, RQAT provides guidance and counseling in a secure, positive environment to introduce fundamental Navy Core Values from the initial day of training. (RQAT Deputy Director, August 1999)

In the program's early days, RQAT personnel attempted to alarm recruits into admitting previously concealed personal history information. The RQAT program's aggressive approach, but not its purpose, has changed in recent years. Sometimes, the recruit may have concealed negative information from the recruiter; in other cases, recruits may claim that their recruiters knew the information, but suppressed it and told the recruit not to tell anyone. Thus, the RQAT is designed to expose potential problems with recruits as well as uncover what is termed "recruiter misconduct" for CNRC to further investigate. This latter aspect of the RQAT's function is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The RQAT members are experienced recruiters

themselves, and know the "tricks of the trade" along with

recruiting regulations. The RQAT is composed of five

Career Recruiting Force personnel, all Chief Petty Officers

(E-7) or above. Each member has served as a Recruiting

Zone Supervisor, overseeing enlisted recruitment programs

at five to nine recruiting stations, or as a Chief

Recruiter, responsible for a Recruiting District composed

of 30 to 40 recruiting stations. The RQAT reports to the

CNRC Inspector General, but is based at the Recruit

Training Center and must work closely with RTC personnel.

The "Moment of Truth" program has changed somewhat over the years. From 1992 until 1996, recruits were subjected to intense pressure during the briefings. They were emphatically warned of the military justice consequences of concealing information (the standard being "10 years in prison or a \$10,000 fine"). The recruits' honesty was questioned in a way that only a Chief Petty Officer can do. However, that "classic" boot camp experience changed upon the arrival of a new CNRC admiral, who agreed with a budding Navy-wide leadership perception that the old way of indoctrinating recruits, that is, terrifying and humiliating them, needed to be changed. As a result, the "Moment of Truth" has become a respectful

appeal to recruits' personal honor. In late May of 1999, the RQAT was directed to temper the "Moment of Truth" presentation further, and the guiding instruction went into revision.

The "Moment of Truth" occurs on the first full day of basic training, or "Boot Camp," for almost every Navy recruit. RTC Great Lakes processes recruits six days a week, 12 months a year, depending upon recruit flows from the Military Entrance Processing Stations (MEPS) nationwide. MEPS do not ship recruits on Sundays, so no recruits are processed on Mondays. "Moment of Truth" sessions are conducted for a minimum of 50 recruits, so it is possible (but unusual) in the winter, when the flow of recruits is slower, that a recruit might not hear the presentation on his or her first day at boot camp.

Recruits arrive at RTC during all hours of the day and night. In the summer, it is not unusual for 400 recruits to arrive in a 24-hour period. Those who arrive early are kept busy until late at night, when they are allowed to get a few hours of sleep--if they can. Those who arrive later in the evening may or may not get any sleep at all. Early on the first morning following their arrival, recruits are rolled out of their bunks, fed breakfast, and given a haircut. They receive their first issue of Navy clothing.

Their civilian clothes and almost all other personal belongings are then packed up and mailed home. From the "mailing evolution," recruits are moved, in groups of 200, into a large briefing room to hear the RQAT presentation. In the summer, the RQAT may give three presentations a day, six days a week.

The timing of the "Moment of Truth" session is important. Though the presentation itself is conducted with decorum, the recruits are definitely fatigued, and many may be lonely, anxious, and questioning their enlistment decision. They have had their individuality stripped away along with their hair, their clothes, and their personal belongings. They have also heard about the "Moment of Truth" from their recruiters and the MEPS staff. In all probability, conflicting stories have circulated about the fearsomeness, the effectiveness, and the consequences of the "Moment of Truth." The recruits are at their most vulnerable when they find themselves facing, not an antagonistic threat that can be indignantly resisted, but a sincere appeal to their "highest nature."

The RQAT brief begins with a discussion of Navy Core Values: "Honor, Courage, Commitment." The RQAT briefers explain the information the recruits will be asked to verify in their own service records. The information

categories of interest, called Basic Enlistment Eligibility Requirements (BEERS), are from the CNRC Enlisted Recruiting Manual (COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1130.8E). BEERS include the recruit's education level, age, history of drug and/or alcohol use, medical conditions, dependent status (whether the recruit has a spouse, children, or other family for which he or she is responsible), and past police involvement. The recruits are then exhorted to have "the courage to be honest," and to choose to demonstrate their integrity by disclosing any BEERS-related information thus far withheld.

Recruits are handed their own service records to review, and asked to verify that the requested information is correctly represented. They are asked to stand at the end of the presentation if they find an error, an omission, or if they wish to provide additional information.

Recruits who stand are then removed from the group, reassembled in another area, and screened by a RQAT member to discover the nature of the problem. Sometimes recruits present information that was not requested by the RQAT (for example, misspelling of their name or the wrong home address). These recruits rejoin the original recruit group and their errors are corrected later. Recruits who do have

pertinent issues are interviewed, one-on-one, by an RQAT member in a private setting.

The results of the interview are recorded on a computerized, standard RQAT interview sheet that includes basic identifying information about the recruit as well as identifying the recruiter and MEPS from which the recruit came. The interview sheet summarizes the nature of the recruit's admission and the RQAT member's assessment for required follow-on action. What action the RQAT takes next is determined by CNRC regulation. Three "action codes" and four offense categories are used in the process. Table 1 shows these RQAT action codes and categories.

Table 1. Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes

Action Codes	Meaning	Civil/Police	Medical "2"	Drug "3"	Other "4"
А	Mandatory Discharge	A1	A2	A3	A4
В	Waiver	B1	B2	В3	B4
С	Local Action	C1	C2	C3	C4

Source: Recruit Quality Assurance Team Deputy Director, July 1999.

As seen in Table 1, an action code of "A2" indicates that a recruit has disclosed a medical condition that requires mandatory discharge. An action code of "C1" means that a recruit has disclosed a prior police-related incident that does not require discharge or a formal waiver, but can be handled administratively by the RQAT.

At the lowest level, action code "C," no action may be required, or a Navy "Page 13" entry (a standardized format for non-punitive, administrative remarks that become part of a servicemember's permanent record) may be made. If the recruit admits to something more serious, a few different actions may be necessary.

Some admissions may require that a formal waiver be granted if the recruit is to continue in the Navy. There is a hierarchy of command authority to grant enlistment waivers, based on the seriousness of the offense or shortcoming. This hierarchy ranges from the recruiting district commanding officer to the Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1130.8E, p. 2-97). For lesser problems, a "local" waiver can be granted directly by the RQAT director, who has the same waiver authority as a recruiting district commanding officer. For other offenses, the higher-level waiver by CNRC/PERS-83 may be required. In some cases, such as pending civil action, further investigation may be necessary to clarify the situation before a waiver can even be considered.

In some cases, the admission may be serious enough that the RQAT recommends immediate discharge of the recruit. In this case, the recruit proceeds to the RTC Legal Department for further processing, because the

recruit actually belongs to RTC at this point, not CNRC.

RTC has final authority on RQAT recommendations, and can
retain a recruit recommended for discharge. CNRC and RTC
have different standards for what constitutes "waiverable"
behavior and conditions; but RTC, as the command to which
the recruit belongs, has the final say on disposition.

Still, very few recruits recommended for discharge by RQAT
are allowed to remain on active duty.

The RQAT submits several reports to CNRC, including a monthly summary report that CNRC later distributes to every recruiting district. A weekly summary is also prepared of the types of recruit problems identified, along with a report that details fraudulent education credential cases. According to the RQAT, this is an increasing problem primarily associated with home-schooled recruits. Further, another weekly report is prepared showing statistics on total recruit separations, waivers, and local documentation (service record administrative remarks or "Page 13's").

C. SELECTED OBSERVATIONS FROM SITE VISIT TO THE RECRUIT QUALITY ASSURANCE TEAM (RQAT)

Due to the dearth of formal literature on the "Moment of Truth," the author conducted a visit to RTC Great Lakes in August 1999. For two days, the author "Moment of Truth" presentations and screening procedures. This proved

extremely valuable in placing the impersonal numerical data analyzed in this study into context in terms of the program's effect on human lives.

The "Moment of Truth" presentations were made in a brisk but professional manner. The recruits, in physical training (PT) gear and with fresh haircuts (shaved heads for the men, short hair for the women), many of them obviously fatigued and under strain, filed into a large, clean, well-lit briefing room under the watchful eye of observing petty officers. These petty officers are distributed around the room to help keep the recruits awake and to assist them in finding documents in their service records during the presentation. The RQAT presenter introduced himself and spoke clearly, without shouting. Military courtesy was required: when the chief asked a question of the group, the response was a rousing "Yes, Chief! or "No, Chief!," as appropriate. The petty officers circulated around the room to ensure that the recruits were paying attention.

The Navy Core Values were presented and their omnipresence in Navy life emphasized. Then, the BEERS information that the recruits were to supposed to verify was explained in detail, one item at a time. When the majority of recruits had found the information (or

determined it was missing), the presenter moved on to the next item. The recruits were asked whether they had been the subject of any unlawful harassment or threatening behavior by their recruiters or MEPS personnel. At the end of the presentation, the RQAT presenter called upon the recruits to stand up if they needed to correct any of the paperwork that had been discussed with them. In each group of roughly 150-200 recruits, 20 to 35 recruits stood up. These recruits were directed out of the room and sent to stand in the passageway outside the RQAT office in orderly single file. The remaining recruits were allowed to stay in the briefing room and rest while their shipmates went through the RQAT screening and interview process.

The RQAT member who screened the recruits called each recruit in turn to stand before him and explain what was wrong with the service record. Recruits whose problems were outside the purview of the RQAT were sent back to the classroom; the others formed a second queue until the screening process was finished. The RQAT screener spoke firmly but professionally with each recruit, allowing only a brief discussion of the issue at hand, stopping occasionally to go out and enforce quiet in the passageway among the waiting recruits. Even then, the emphasis was on teamwork: each recruit deserved the same opportunity as the

next to be heard, and the recruits were required to demonstrate the same courtesy to their shipmates that they would expect to receive in return.

After the screening, one-half to two-thirds of the recruits had been sent back to the briefing room. Many of these recruits were missing paperwork that had to be obtained from the MEPS. A phone call and fax later would take care of these recruits' issues. The remaining recruits were interviewed.

The interviews were militarily correct, but kept "low-key." The recruit entered, placed his or her service record on the Chief's desk, and stood at attention. If the interview lasted longer than a few minutes, the recruit was put "at ease," a more comfortable position in which to stand. The Chief spoke quietly with each recruit, asking about his or her problem. The recruit was now given a chance to explain the whole story.

The following are some of the tales the author heard during two days of interviews:

Some recruits had recent traffic tickets that had not been revealed the recruiter or to the MEPS (a requirement when in the Delayed Entry Program, or DEP). A determination had to be made whether alcohol or drugs were a factor in the violation (in these interviews, there were

no such incidents). All observed recruits were allowed to continue service, after receiving on-the-spot waivers by the RQAT interviewer.

One recruit reported that he had obtained several new tattoos while in the DEP. None of the tattoos appeared gang-related. The recruit was allowed to continue.

A recruit said that he had a history of back problems and had concealed it from his recruiter. His back hurt already, and he had been at RTC one night. He easily bent over to the floor to pick up a paper he dropped. He was sent to medical.

Another recruit stated that she was allergic to bee stings. This recruit was sent to medical for evaluation. Serious allergic reaction (anaphylactic shock) to insect stings would disqualify a person from enlisting.

A recruit stated that he had a serious problem with asthma in the past, but that he had been "okay" for "a couple years." He said no one had asked him if he had asthma. There was a brief discussion of whether the recruit didn't think the medical form he had filled out, checking "No" to the question "Do you now/have you ever had any of the following medical conditions..." constituted "being asked." He was sent to medical.

An 18-year-old recruit began by saying he had been celebrating with his sister a day or two before reporting to boot camp, and had "inadvertently" wound up smoking marijuana. He was concerned about a possible positive result on a urinalysis test. After further questioning, conducted quietly, professionally, and without threats, the recruit ended up admitting to a extensive, four-year history of drug use. This included marijuana use on a weekly basis; consuming "magic mushrooms" on a number of occasions; taking Ritalin and another prescription drug (neither of which had been prescribed to him) for a year; and trying cocaine more than once. This recruit had stated to his recruiter that he had smoked marijuana a total of three times. He was recommended for discharge and sent to the Separations Branch.

A female recruit stated that she had sought counseling for suicidal thoughts just before entering active service. She stated that she had been feeling suicidal for months and had, on several occasions, considered killing herself. She was sent to medical for a psychiatric evaluation.

A nearly incoherent, tearful, 30-year-old male recruit tried for 15 minutes to explain his problem to the Chief.

It had something to do with a traffic violation and the fact that the "people at the MEPS yelled" at him when he

wrote the statement they told him to write after he informed them of the traffic ticket. It quickly became apparent that there was something seriously wrong with the recruit, and he was sent to medical for psychiatric evaluation. The report back the next day was that the recruit was developmentally disabled, with a mental age of about eight years, and probably could not have taken the AFQT by himself. Paperwork for a possible recruiter misconduct investigation was initiated, and the recruit was sent home. This especially sad case was the subject of much discussion between the two Chiefs. How could this recruit have been examined by the MEPS medical officer and approved for enlistment?

A prior-service recruit who had been in the Army for 5 years admitted to a felony domestic violence conviction for which he did jail time, but said it wasn't his fault. He also admitted to serious traffic violations and stated that he "didn't want to be here." He was given an uncharacterized, entry-level discharge (neither honorable, other than honorable, or dishonorable), which supersedes the honorable discharge he had received from the Army.

A recruit stated that his father's high school diploma was in his service record. This could not be explained, and the Chief's feeling was that fraud was involved. This

case was not immediately settled, as the Chief was unable to contact the recruiter and MEPS concerned.

A recruit stated that he was concerned about a possible positive result on his urinalysis because he wasn't sure "whether those pills the recruiter gave me to flush out my system" would really work. This recruit was asked to write a statement, and paperwork was initiated for a recruiter misconduct investigation.

A composed, 20-year-old recruit reported that, at the age of 15, he had stabbed a classmate to death at his high The recruit had spent three years in juvenile detention and had undergone counseling, taken antidepressant drugs, and been on parole for two more years. This recruit had completed a year of college after getting out of juvenile confinement. The recruit stated that he had not told his recruiter about his past because, after he was able to obtain a gun license in his home state, he assumed his juvenile record was sealed and "no one would find out." Though he showed no remorse over the killing, he did say that he had admitted it because of the Chief's appeal to his sense of honor. The recruit was to be discharged for concealing his felony history. leaving the RQAT office, this recruit asked the Chief an interesting question, and one that should concern the Navy

chain of command: "Chief, if I hadn't of told you, would you have found out?"

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF FIRST-TERM ATTRITION

The United States Navy annually devotes thousands of personnel and millions of dollars to the recruiting of qualified youths and their later training. Since 1974, shortly after the inception of the All-Volunteer Force, almost a third of these officially "qualified" recruits have failed to complete their initial term of enlistment (GAO/Gebicke, March 12, 1998, p. 3). This phenomenon of failing to complete the initial enlistment, termed "first-term attrition," is a stubborn and costly problem. The attrition of these recruits, no matter how far along in their term of service, is an irreplaceable loss of Navy money and person-hours. And, the farther from the recruiter's desk the recruit is when he or she fails, the more expensive that failure is for the Navy.

Screening procedures to identify unqualified recruits exist at many levels: the Navy recruiter who first chats with young prospects; the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS), which tests and physically examines all recruits; and the basic training command (or "boot camp") personnel who, for eight weeks, intensively observe and challenge recruits. This assessment process is intended to

quickly find and eliminate the unsuitable recruit, thus minimizing the loss of time and money to the Navy.

Before screening can even begin, however, it is necessary to understand what factors or characteristics of a given recruit may make him or her more likely to become an attrition case. Because of the intractability of the attrition problem, there is a large body of research on the subject (for example, Buddin, 1984; Cooke and Quester, 1992; Fitz and McDaniel, 1988, in addition to studies discussed here). As a result, a number of generally accepted recruit characteristics have been identified that are fairly reliable predictors of whether a recruit will, on average, successfully complete his or her first enlistment.

Traits that tend to increase a recruit's likelihood of completing the first term of enlistment include being Black or Hispanic, having a high school diploma (not a General Education Development [GED] diploma or other alternate certification), and being in a higher Armed Forces

Qualification Test (AFQT) category. Traits that tend to be associated with a higher likelihood of first-term attrition include not possessing a high school diploma, and being older than the average recruit (Buddin, 1984; Cooke and Quester, 1992).

B. FIRST-TERM ATTRITION RESEARCH RELEVANT TO THE "MOMENT OF TRUTH"

No study was found that focused specifically on "Moment of Truth" recruits and their enlistment outcomes.

Two studies were found (Knox, 1998, and Jacklich, 1998)

that mentioned the RQAT program, in passing, as part of a discussion of the costs of RTC attrition. This thesis differs somewhat from other studies that observe attrition and retrospectively try to determine why it occurred. The "Moment of Truth" recruits in this study were already identified with risk factors early in their enlistment, but were allowed to continue naval service. Therefore, the discussion focuses only on studies that seemed most applicable to assessing the survival chances of "Moment of Truth" recruits.

Several researchers have found that recruits with a pre-service criminal history (one or more arrests regardless of conviction or acquittal) tend to be more likely to become first-term attrition cases (Flyer, 1995; Frabutt, 1996; Bohn and Schmitz, 1996). This research typically looks at enlistees who receive "unsuitability" discharges, as opposed to medical, general, or administrative discharges. Unsuitability relates to a recruit's failure to meet minimum behavior or performance

standards. Unsuitability discharges are identified by Inter-Service Separation Codes (ISCs) 60 through 87 and 101-102. (See Appendix A for a full list of ISCs.)

One well-known study of unsuitability attrition matched the military records of thousands of Navy enlistees during the 1980s to juvenile and adult criminal records from California, Florida, and Illinois (Flyer, 1995). study found that, overall, recruits who had an arrest record, regardless of conviction status, were 65 percent more likely than other recruits to be discharged for unsuitability (Flyer, 1995, p. 58). Unsuitability discharge rates increase dramatically when the individual has more than one arrest. In addition, research shows that a history of certain types of crimes (for example, violent felonies) also results in relatively higher attrition rates when compared with other crimes (such as non-violent felonies or misdemeanors). For all categories of crime, however, the unsuitability attrition rate for recruits with an arrest history tends to be higher than for those with no arrest history (Flyer, 1995, p. 62).

Flyer (1995) also notes that, among his large samples, there is a qualitative difference between recruits with and without a pre-service criminal history. Male, non-high school graduates in lower AFQT categories were found to be

"over-represented" in the criminal history group, with arrest rates for Blacks and Whites about the same, and significantly lower rates for Hispanics (Flyer, 1995, p. 57).

Flyer's (1995) findings on the effects of a preservice criminal history are supported by a study that focused on unsuitability discharges among a large sample of California recruits who entered the Navy from 1982 through 1989 (Frabutt, 1996). Fully one-third of the recruit sample had some pre-service criminal history, and a number of recruits joined the Navy with wholly or partially concealed criminal records (Frabutt, 1996, p. 47).

Recruits with pre-service criminal encounters had first-term unsuitability discharge rates up to 30 percentage points higher than recruits without a criminal history (Frabutt, 1996, p. 24). Frabutt also noted, as did Flyer (1995, p. 59), that the unsuitability discharge rate increased as the criminal history became more serious (Frabutt, 1996, p.29).

Frabutt (1996) also examined the difference in attrition rates between recruits who had a concealed arrest history and those who had admitted to a pre-service legal encounter (PLE) prior to the "Moment of Truth." He found that recruits who had concealed their PLE history had a 44-

percent unsuitability discharge rate, while those who admitted to a PLE had "only" a 31.6-percent unsuitability discharge rate. Recruits with no PLE, however, had a 20.7-percent unsuitability discharge rate (Frabutt, 1996, p. 42).

In contrast to Flyer's (1995) and Frabutt's (1996) results, a study by Bohn and Schmitz (1996) found that Navy enlistees with a criminal waiver had an attrition rate only 5 percentage points higher than that of other recruits (Bohn and Schmitz, 1996, p. 9). This difference was about a third of the difference in attrition rates reported by Flyer. The study by Bohn and Schmidt (1996), which examined a random 20-percent sample of the FY 1992 and 1993 enlisted cohorts, also found little difference between attrition for enlistees with non-criminal moral waivers, including drug and alcohol waivers, and enlistees with no waiver.

In contrast to both Flyer (1995) and Frabutt (1996), who found attrition highest among recruits with felony waivers, Bohn and Schmitz found that persons with non-minor misdemeanor waivers had the highest two-year attrition rate (32.7 percent). These non-minor misdemeanor waivers were the most common in the sample, accounting for 68.4 percent of all waivers (Bohn and Schmitz, 1996, p. 3).

Although there has been some research on the effect of pre-service criminal history on first-term attrition, no research could be found that discusses the first-term attrition behavior of recruits with a medical waiver. As seen in Chapter IV of the thesis, medical-related discharges occur among "Moment of Truth" recruits with all combinations of offense and action codes; but not a single medical discharge or waiver (RQAT codes B1 and B2, respectively; see Table 1) was granted among the more than 8,000 "Moment of Truth" records examined. The effectiveness of the RQAT's "local action" handling of medical admissions is unclear (RQAT code C2; see Table 1).

C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ATTRITION STUDIES FOR "MOMENT OF TRUTH" RECRUITS

Flyer's (1995) and Frabutt's (1996) findings are particularly important when looking at "Moment of Truth" recruits who present a criminal history and are allowed to continue service. Bohn and Schmitz's (1996) study, while differing from previous research in its assessment of the effect of criminal history and the unsuitability discharge rates of recruits with criminal waivers, agrees that there is still a difference between PLE recruits and those with no waiver for criminal history.

This thesis focuses on the broader RQAT offense categories rather than on the specifics of each recruit's exact admission; but recruits who fall under the RQAT "Legal" category at any level of required action (waiver or "local action") may be at greater risk to become an early loss.

No hypothesis can be made concerning the attrition behavior of "Moment of Truth" recruits who admit to other problems that do not require formal waivers, receiving only administrative documentation such as a memorandum in their service record or, perhaps, requiring no action at all.

Nor can anything more be said about the RQAT medical category than to report the findings on discharge rates and separation codes for these recruits.

IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

A. THE ROAT DATA SETS

The Deputy Director of the RQAT provided a Microsoft Access data file with complete information on all FY 1998 and FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" recruits from October 1998 through March 1999. This information, totaling 5,761 records for FY 1998 and 2,380 records for FY 1999, was provided to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), where it was converted into Microsoft Excel and then entered into the DMDC mainframe to be matched with other DMDC databases.

The original data sets included multiple files that detailed all the RQAT interview information, such as the recruit's name, Social Security Number (SSN), recruiting district of origin, recruiter name, MEPS through which processed, and so on. Detailed descriptions of the information provided by each recruit were also included. The files of particular interest, however, are those that break down recruits by RQAT action codes. These can be combined with selected recruit characteristics of interest for further analysis and comparison with Navy recruits overall.

Recruit characteristics of interest (variables) were selected based on their usefulness for explaining the

composition of the "Moment of Truth" recruit set. Table 2 details the selected characteristics. Computer record matching was performed to eliminate incomplete recruit records, although some records were retained that were missing no more than one variable. (Education level and AFQT score data field entries were most likely to be missing.) Files with missing data for any one variable do not exceed 1 percent of the total records per year, with

Table 2. Selected Characteristics of Recruits: Variable Name and Description

Variable Name	Description
SEX	Gender:
	Male, Female
RCE_ETH	Racial/Ethnic Origin:
	Black; White; API (Asian/Pacific Islander);
	Hispanic; Native American; Other
MENT_CAT	AFQT Mental Category: I - IIIB (no CAT IV's
	in data sets)
ED_LEVEL	Highest Education Attained at Enlistment: College; HSG (High School Graduate); Non- HSG (Non-High School Graduate); Alt Educ (Alternate Education Credential); GED
AGE_ENT	Age at Entry: By year, ages 17 - 24; and 25+
WVR	Waiver Code: 1 through 17 (see DMDC Active Duty Military Master and Loss Edit Documentation)
ISC_GP6	Inter-service Separation Code (ISC): ISC Groupings for RQAT recruits separated 6 months or less after entering active duty (1998 data only due to data cutoff). See Table 3 for ISC Grouping description
ISC_GP2	ISC Groupings for RQAT recruits separated 2 months or less after entering active duty

of education level (4.8 percent for FY 1998 and 2.2 percent for FY 1999).

DMDC's Active Duty Enlisted Master Gain and Loss files, as well as the CNRC training attrition database and the Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) Edit File, were used to help minimize the number of incomplete files. SSNs and other information that could identify individual recruits, recruiters/recruiting stations, and MEPS were removed. When the matching was finished, 5,705 complete files remained in the FY 1998 data set, and 2,371 files were left in the FY 1999 data set. Next, crosstabulations of the variables representing recruit characteristics of interest were obtained using SAS programs created by Mr. William King, a database expert and consultant to NPS.

B. DESCRIPTIONS OF THE VARIABLES

Since the composition of the "Moment of Truth" recruit group has not been previously studied, the variables used in this analysis were chosen for their broad descriptive nature. They are intended to create a general portrait of the group, and are also used to compare the "Moment of Truth" recruits with the larger cohort of all Navy recruits for FY 1998 and the first half of FY 1999. Detailed descriptions of the variables, and Active Duty Master File

Data Element Record Position (abbreviated RP) where applicable, follow.

SEX (RP 27) - Recruit gender.

RACE/ETHNIC ORIGIN (RP 26) - This is a simpler breakdown, chosen over Ethnic Group (RP 25, 22 categories) because of the relatively small sample size.

MENTAL CATEGORY (RP 31E) - AFQT categories I through IVA.

EDUCATION LEVEL (RP 106E) - Highest education level

achieved at time of enlistment. "College" subcategory

includes any amount of college. "Alternate Education"

subcategory includes home school certificates.

AGE AT ENTRY (RP 32) - Recruit age at entry to active service, by year, from ages 17 through 24 and then grouped for 25 years and older.

WAIVER (RP 129) - Indicates whether recruit received enlistment waiver. See Appendix B for complete list and description of enlistment waiver codes.

ISC GROUP (6 MONTHS) - "ISC_GP6" variable was researcher created; indicates recruits discharged, and under what ISC discharge grouping code, within 6 months of entering active service. This variable was used only for FY98 as FY99 recruit data was too recent for a 6 month follow-up.

ISC GROUP (2 MONTHS) - "ISC_GP2" variable was researcher

created; indicates whether recruits discharged, and under what ISC discharge grouping code, within 2 months of entering active service.

Table 3. Inter-Service Separation Code (ISC) Groupings

ISC Group Titles	ISC Codes in Group
Medical	10 - 17
Psychological	60 - 63
Drugs/Alcohol	64, 67
Financial	68 - 69
Legal	71 - 84, 101 - 105
Performance	65 - 66, 85 - 87
Other Reasons	2 - 8, 22, 30 - 33,
	40 - 42, 70, 90 - 99

Note: See Appendix A for complete list of ISCs. Source: Groupings created by author and Mr. William King, DMDC.

C. THE FY 1998 AND FY 1999 NAVY ENLISTED ACCESSION COHORT DATA SETS

To provide perspective on findings for the "Moment of Truth" data sets, the FY 1998 Navy enlisted accession cohort and the first six months of the FY 1999 enlisted accession cohort were run and matched using the same procedures and variables as the "Moment of Truth" groups.

After the refinement process, a total of 43,028 records remained on FY 1998 enlisted accessions. The first six months of FY 1999 consisted of 14,647 recruit records.

These data sets are compared with "Moment of Truth" data in Chapter V.

V. DATA ANALYSIS

A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FY 1998 AND FY 1999 RQAT DATA SETS

This section discusses the general characteristics of recruits in the RQAT "Moment of Truth" (MOT) data sets.

These characteristics are compared between the FY 1998 and FY 1999 RQAT groups and with the total Navy enlisted accession cohorts for the same time periods. It should be noted again that FY 1999 data cover only the first six months of the fiscal year (1 October 1998 through 31 March 1999).

Table 4 compares the gender distribution of FY 1998 and 1999 MOT recruits with that of all Navy enlisted accessions for the same years. As seen here, women constitute a smaller proportion of MOT recruits than of the population of recruits during each year. For example, women account for 17.9 percent of FY 1998 MOT recruits, compared with 19.1 percent of all Navy enlisted accessions that year. Further, women represent 15.9 percent of MOT recruits in FY 1999 as of 31 March 1999, but, again, 19.1 percent of Navy accessions. At the same time, men are correspondingly over-represented among MOT recruits.

As seen in Tables 5 and 6, differences are likewise found in the racial and ethnic composition of MOT recruits

Table 4. Gender Composition of FY 1998 and FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits During Corresponding Periods, FY 1998-1999

Fiscal Year and	Me	n	Wo	men	Total	
Population	Number I	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1998 MOT	4,685	82.1	1,020	17.9	5,701	100.0
All Recruits	34,820	80.9	8,208	19.1	43,028	100.0
1999 [*] MOT	1,994	84.1	377	15.9	2,371	100.0
All Recruits	14,647	80.9	3,455	9.1	18,102	100.0

^{*}Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

and total enlisted accessions. For both FY 1998 and FY 1999, Whites are somewhat over-represented among MOT recruits compared with their proportion among total Navy accessions. For example, during FY 1998, Whites account for 62.1 percent of MOT recruits and 59.3 percent of the overall recruit population. Further, during the first six months of FY 1999, Whites constitute 63.2 percent of MOT recruits and 60.2 percent of all accessions. By contrast, minorities tend to be under-represented among recruits who speak up during the "Moment of Truth." For example, Black recruits were 16.8 percent of all accessions.

Table 5. Racial/Ethnic Background of "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Accessions, FY 1998

Racial/	ı	OT	All Re	cruits
Ethnic Group	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
White	3,544	62.1	25,498	59.3
Black	1,091	19.1	8,673	20.2
Hispanic	604	10.6	4,804	11.2
Asian/Pacific	212	3.7	2,219	5.2
Islander				
Native American	206	3.6	1,401	3.3
Other	48	0.8	433	1.0
Total	5,705	100.0	43,028	100.0

Source: Special database derived from information provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Table 6. Racial/Ethnic Background of "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Accessions, FY 1999*

Racial/	М	OT	All Recruits		
Ethnic Group	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
White	1,499	63.2	10,897	60.2	
Black	399	16.8	3,472	19.2	
Hispanic	266	11.2	1,930	10.7	
Asian/Pacific	87	3.7	923	5.1	
Islander					
Native American	93	3.9	700	3.9	
Other	27	1.1	180	1.0	
Total	2,371	100.0	18,102	100.0	

*Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Table 7 compares MOT recruits and total Navy accessions in terms of Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) categories. As seen here, no clear pattern can be found. MOT recruits tend to be nearly representative of the total population of recruits.

Table 7. AFQT Categories of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits

	M	TOT	All Recruits		
AFQT Category	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Cat I	335	5.9	2,180	5.1	
Cat II	1,938	34.0	14,681	34.1	
Cat IIIA	1,425	25.0	10,597	24.6	
Cat IIIB	1,981	34.7	15,453	35.9	
Cat IV	2	0.0	22	0.0	
Unknown	24	0.4	95	0.2	
Total	5,705	100.0	43,028	100.0	

Source: Special database derived from information provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Table 8. AFQT Categories of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits*

	M	OT	All Recruits		
AFQT Category	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Cat I	124	5.2	947	5.2	
Cat II	822	34.7	6,320	34.9	
Cat IIIA	680	28.7	4,800	26.5	
Cat IIIB	737	31.1	5,996	33.1	
Cat IV	1	0.0	9	0.0	
Unknown	. 7	0.3	977	5.4	
Total	2,371	100.0	18,102	100.0	

^{*}Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Data on recruits' level of education show slight differences between MOT recruits and all recruits (see Tables 9 and 10). High school graduates, the largest education group, are slightly under-represented among MOT recruits. All other educational groups are slightly over-represented among MOT recruits, when compared with all Navy recruits.

Table 9. Education Level of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits

	M	OT	All Recruits		
Education Level	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
College	141	2.5	808	1.9	
High School Grad	4,666	81.8	39,963	85.9	
Alternate Credential	243	4.3	1,583	3.7	
GED	215	3.8	1,353	3.1	
Non-High School Grad	167	2.9	1,017	2.4	
Unknown/Missing	273	4.8	1,304	3.0	
Total	5,705	100.0	43,028	100.0	

Source: Special database derived from information provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Table 10. Education Level of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits*

	M	OT	All Recruits		
Education Level	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
College	81	3.4	434	2.4	
High School Grad	1,700	71.7	13,752	76.0	
Alternate Credential	184	7.8	1,243	6.9	
GED	233	9.8	1,422	7.9	
Non-High School Grad	122	5.2	816	4.5	
Unknown/Missing	51	2.2	435	2.4	
Total	2,371	100.0	18,102	100.0	

*Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Education had the greatest percentage of missing or unknown values in the MOT and total accession databases.

Almost 5 percent of FY 1998 MOT records, and 2 to 3 percent of the other databases, were missing education information.

Examination of recruits' age at time of entry into active service shows that MOT representation tends to increase with age. Table 11 shows that, after the ages of

20 (in FY 1998) to 21 (in FY 1999), older recruits are consistently over-represented in the MOT compared with the total population of recruits.

Table 11. Entry Age of FY 1998 and FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits During Corresponding Periods, FY 1998 - FY 1999

_		19	98		1999*			
Age (in	М	TOT	All Re	ecruits	М	TOT	All Recruits	
years)	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
17	241	4.2	2,285	5.3	78	3.3	656	3.6
18	1,681	29.5	15,041	35.0	499	21.0	5,130	24.7
19	1,290	22.6	10,071	23.4	557	23.5	4,476	24.7
20	780	13.7	5,417	12.6	333	14.0	2,780	15.4
21	512	9.0	3,260	7.6	284	12.0	1,815	10.0
22	358	6.3	2,069	4.8	180	7.6	1,153	6.4
23	247	4.3	1,389	3.2	114	4.8	766	4.2
24	167	3.0	993	2.3	94	4.0	568	3.1
25+	429	7.5	2,503	5.8	232	9.8	1,414	7.8
Total	5,705	100.0	43,028	100.0	2,371	100.0	18,102	100.0

*Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

One explanation is that older recruits may have had more time to experience personal troubles than did those who enter active service directly from high school. It is also worth noting that the FY 1999 MOT and total accession cohorts are (and were expected to be) a slightly older group on the whole. The population of recruits who enter active service in the fall and winter (October through March, the first six months of the fiscal year) may include proportionately more people who dropped out of college in the first semester, or were less motivated (or unable) to find satisfactory employment after high school.

Otherwise, the only notable difference between MOT recruits and all accessions is that, in FY 1998, 18-year-old recruits were under-represented by 5 percentage points in the MOT, compared with their percentage among all recruits.

The final comparison between the MOT and total accession cohorts involves waiver status. Waiver status, as used here, indicates whether a recruit entered the Navy with a formal waiver prior to the "Moment of Truth." Table 12 presents this comparison. In both years, MOT recruits were slightly more likely to have entered the Navy with a moral or other non-medical waiver, and slightly less likely to have a medical waiver, than were all recruits.

Table 12. Waiver Status of FY 1998 and FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits During Corresponding Periods, FY 1998-FY 1999

Fiscal Year and	None		Moral		Medical		All Other		Total	
Population	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1998										
MOT	3,633	63.7	672	11.8	326	5.7	1,074	18.8	5,705	100.0
All										
recruits	28,001	65.1	4,887	11.4	2,564	6.0	7,576	17.6	43,028	100.0
1999*										
MOT	1,294	54.6	325	13.7	148	6.3	604	25.5	2,371	100.0
All										
recruits	10,381	57.3	2,358	13.0	1,234	6.9	4,129	22.8	18,102	100.0

*Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

To summarize this section of the chapter, "Moment of Truth" recruits appear to differ only slightly from all

Navy Recruits. For example, MOT recruits are slightly more likely to be male, white, older than the average recruit, and to already have an entry-level waiver. At the same time, MOT recruits are less likely to have the education level of a typical Navy recruit, that is, to be a high school graduate. MOT recruits are slightly more likely to have some college education, or to hold an alternate education credential.

B. "MOMENT OF TRUTH" RECRUIT CATEGORIES

This section examines the types of admissions recruits make at the "Moment of Truth" and the actions taken with respect to these recruits (waiver, discharge, etc.).

Selected recruit demographics in the various action categories are also discussed. Table 13, below, reproduces Table 1 from Chapter II of this study, and is provided here for easy reference with the tables that follow.

Table 13. Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes

Action Codes	Meaning	Civil/Police "1"	Medical "2"	Drug "3"	Other "4"
A	Mandatory Discharge	A1	A2	A3	A4
В	Waiver	B1	B2	В3	B4
С	Local Action	C1	C2	C3	C4

Source: Recruit Quality Assurance Team Deputy Director, July 1999.

Table 14. Gender Distribution of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes

	A		В		С		Total	
Gender	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Male	269	91.2	950	86.1	3,466	80.5	4,685	82.1
Female	26	8.8	154	13.9	840	19.5	1,020	17.9
Total	295	100.0	1,104	100.0	4,306	100.0	5,705	100.0

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Table 14 illustrates the gender distribution of "Moment of Truth" recruits in each RQAT action category during FY 1998. Only a small percentage of total MOT recruits were recommended for discharge; and more than 90 percent of these are men. Men are over-represented in both Action Codes "A" (91.2 percent) and "B" (86.1 percent), compared with their 82 percent representation in the FY 1998 MOT population. About 5 percent of FY 1998 MOT recruits (295 of 5,705) had a problem that required discharge from service (Action Code A). About 20 percent of MOT recruits (1,104 of 5,705), more than 85 percent of them men, had a problem that required a formal waiver (Action Code B). Seventy-five percent of MOT recruits (4,306 of 5,705) revealed issues that required only local action (Action Code C), and continuation in training. About 74 percent of all MOT men (3,466 of 4,685 total men)

are in this category, compared with 82 percent of MOT women (840 of 1,020 total women).

Table 15 shows the gender distribution by RQAT action code for FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" recruits (from October through March 1999). This cohort contains proportionately more men than women when compared with the FY 1998 group, which covers the full 12-month fiscal year.

Table 15. Gender Distribution of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes*

	A		В		С		Total	
Gender	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Male	206	91.6	517	89.0	1,271	81.2	1,994	84.1
Female	19	8.4	64	11.0	294	18.8	377	16.1
Total	225	100.0	581	100.0	1,565	100.0	2,371	100.0

*Includes October through March 1999.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Table 15 shows that total Action Code "A" admissions by FY 1999 MOT recruits (225 in the first six months) are already approaching the FY 1998 total of 295. Men, again, account for more than 90 percent of "A" admissions, and almost 90 percent of "B" admissions. These percentages are somewhat higher than the proportion of men (84.1 percent) in the FY 1999 MOT population. Women are concentrated in the "C" category, with 78 percent (294 of 377) making admissions that were handled by local documentation.

Overall, two-thirds of FY 1999 MOT recruits (1,565 of

2,371) could be handled at the local level, compared with three-fourths of all FY 1998 MOT recruits.

As previously discussed, the FY 1999 group (winter accessions) is slightly older than the FY 1998 group, which includes new high school graduates. These older recruits may be considered more likely to have some problem in their background. It will be interesting to see whether the final figures for FY 1999 MOT recruits indicate that this group produced more "A" admissions (discharge recommended) overall.

Tables 16 and 17 compare racial/ethnic composition and RQAT Action Codes for FY 1998 and FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" recruits, respectively.

Table 16. Racial/Ethnic Distribution of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes

Racial/	A			В		С	Total	
Ethnic Group	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
White	212	74.4	653	59.2	2,679	62.2	3,544	62.1
Black	27	9.5	246	22.3	818	19.0	1,091	19.1
Hispanic	34	11.9	122	11.0	448	10.4	604	10.5
Asian/PI	10	3.5	33	3.0	169	3.9	212	3.8
Native Am.	11	3.6	41	3.7	154	3.6	206	3.6
Other	1	0.3	9	0.8	38	0.9	48	0.8
Total	285	100.0	1,104	100.0	4,306	100.0	5,705	100.0

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense

Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Table 17. Racial/Ethnic Distribution of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes*

Racial/	A			В		С	То	Total	
Ethnic Group	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
White	164	73.2	349	60.6	981	63.5	1,499	63.2	
Black	19	8.5	128	22.2	252	16.3	399	16.8	
Hispanic	18	8.5	62	10.8	186	12.1	266	11.2	
Asian/PI	7	3.1	19	3.3	61	3.9	87	3.7	
Native Am.	16	7.1	. 18	3.1	59	3.8	93	3.9	
Other	1	0.4	5	0.9	21	1.4	27	1.1	
Total	224	100.0	576	100.0	1,544	100.0	2,371	100.0	

*Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

For all racial/ethnic groups in both years, MOT admissions predominantly fall in the RQAT "C" Action Code, allowing local action to be taken and the recruit to continue training. Whites account for the largest proportion of any Action Code group, and comprise almost three-quarters of Action Code "A" recruits for both years. This is noticeably higher than the proportion of Whites (roughly 62 to 63 percent) in the MOT population as a whole. Blacks receive about 22 percent of all waivers granted, slightly more than their percentage of the MOT population. Blacks appear much less likely to be recommended for discharge than Whites.

Tables 18 and 19 show the AFQT Category of MOT recruits by Action Code in FY 1998 and FY 1999, respectively.

Table 18. AFQT Category Distribution of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes

AFQT		A		В		С	To	tal
Category	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
I	. 3	1.0	50	4.5	282	6.5	335	5.9
II	90	30.5	354	32.1	1,494	34.7	1,938	34.0
IIIA	82	27.8	294	26.6	1,049	24.4	1,425	25.0
IIIB	119	40.3	404	36.6	1,458	33.9	1,981	34.7
IV	0	0.0	1	0.1	1	0.0	2	0.0
Unknown	1	0.3	1	0.1	22	0.5	24	0.4
Total	295	100.0	1,104	100.0	4,306	100.0	5,705	100.0

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

MOT recruits in AFQT Category I comprise 5.9 percent of all MOT recruits in FY 1998 and 5.3 percent of these recruits in the first six months of FY 1999. These recruits primarily fall within Action Code "C," requiring only local action to resolve whatever admission they make. Recruits in AFQT Categories IIIA and IIIB are over-

Table 19. AFQT Category Distribution of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes*

AFQT		A		В	С		Total	
Category	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
I	6	2.7	24	4.1	94	6.0	124	5.3
II	61	27.1	182	31.3	579	37.0	822	34.7
IIIA	79	35.1	181	31.2	420	26.8	680	28.7
IIIB	79	35.1	190	32.7	468	29.9	737	31.1
IV	0	0.0	1	0.2	0	0.0	1	0.0
Unknown	0	0.0	3	0.1	4	0.2	7	0.3
Total	225	100.0	581	100.0	1,565	100.0	2,371	100.0

*Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense

Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

represented in RQAT Action Codes "A" and "B," when compared with their population among all MOT recruits.

Tables 20 and 21 show the education level of MOT recruits within RQAT Action Code categories. It should be noted that 4.8 percent of the FY 1998 MOT cohort and 2.1 percent of the FY 1999 cohort had records that were missing information of education level.

Table 20. Education Level of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes

Education		A		В		С		tal
Level	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
College	3	1.0	20	1.8	118	2.7	141	2.5
HS Grad	212	71.9	847	76.7	3,607	83.8	4,666	81.8
Alt.Ed.	20	6.8	61	5.5	162	3.8	243	4.3
Non-HS	20	6.8	47	4.2	100	2.3	167	3.0
GED	21	7.1	65	5.9	129	3.0	215	3.8
Unknown	19	6.4	64	5.8	190	4.4	273	4.8
Total	295	100.0	1,104	100.0	4,306	100.0	5,705	100.0

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Table 21. Education Level of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes*

Education	A			В		C		tal
Level	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
College	6	2.8	13	2.2	62	4.0	81	3.4
HS Grad	120	53.3	379	65.2	1,201	77.0	1,700	71.7
Alt.Ed.	35	15.6	63	10.8	86	5.5	184	7.8
Non-HS	17	7.6	37	6.4	68	4.3	122	5.2
GED	41	18.2	72	12.4	120	7.7	233	9.8
Unknown	6	2.8	17	2.9	28	1.8	51	2.2
Total	225	100.0	581	100.0	1,565	100.0	2,371	100.0

*Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

For FY 1998, high school graduates and recruits with some college are under-represented among Action Code "A" (discharge) and "B" (waiver) recruits. Recruits with all other education credentials are over-represented in these categories, a pattern repeated in the first six months of FY 1999.

Tables 22 and 23 show the waiver status of MOT recruits by RQAT Action Codes for FY 1998 and the first six months of FY 1999, respectively. In FY 1998, 63.7 percent of MOT recruits had no entry waiver at the time they stood before the RQAT interviewer. Almost 12 percent had a moral waiver. Of recruits recommended for separation, 48 percent had no waiver, while almost a quarter (23.4 percent) had a moral waiver. In the first six months of FY 1999, 54.5 percent of MOT recruits had no waiver. Though the numbers are not directly comparable and the distribution may change Table 22. Waiver Status of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action

Waiver		A		В		С	То	tal
Category	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
None	142	48.1	641	58.1	2,850	66.2	3,633	63.7
Moral	69	23.4	158	14.3	445	10.3	672	11.8
Medical	12	4.1	75	6.8	239	5.6	326	5.6
Other	72	24.4	230	20.8	772	17.9	1,074	18.8
Total	295	100.0	1,104	100.0	4,306	100.0	5,705	100.0

Code

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team. by the end of the year, the first six months of FY 1999 showed an increase of recruits with "other" waivers, when compared with their distribution in all of FY 1998.

Table 23. Waiver Status of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Code*

Waiver		A		В	C		Total	
Category	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
None	102	45.3	304	52.3	888	56.7	1,294	54.6
Moral	50	22.2	81	13.9	194	12.4	325	13.7
Medical	8	3.6	34	5.6	106	6.8	148	6.2
Other	65	28.9	162	27.9	377	24.1	1,024	25.4
Total	225	100.0	581	100.0	1,565	100.0	2,371	100.0

^{*}Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Tables 24 and 25 show the overview of the distribution of MOT recruits by RQAT Action Code and Offense Category.

In FY 1998, more than 93 percent of RQAT recommendations for discharge (275 of 295 "A" recruits) resulted from admissions of previously undocumented civil/police

Table 24. Distribution of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruit by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes/Offense Category

Offense Category	A Number Percent		Number	B Percent	Number	C Percent		tal Percent
Civil/Police	115	39.0	935	84.7	2,739	63.7	3,789	66.4
Medical	0	0.0	0	0.0	970	22.5	970	17.0
Drugs	160	54.2	53	4.8	438	10.2	651	11.4
Other	20	6.8	116	10.5	159	3.7	295	5.2
Total	295	100.0	1,104	100.0	4,306	100.0	5,705	100.0

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Table 25. Distribution of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruit by Recruit Quality Assurance Team (RQAT) Action Codes/Offense Category*

Offense		A		В	C		Total	
Category	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Civil/	112	50.0	500	86.1	1,037	43.7	1,649	69.6
Police								
Medical	0	0.0	0	0.0	392	16.5	392	16.5
Drugs	94	41.8	20	3.4	94	4.0	208	8.8
Other	19	8.4	61	10.5	42	1.8	122	5.1
Total	225	100.0	581	100.0	1,565	100.0	2,371	100.0

^{*}Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

involvement or drug history. Drug use alone accounted for more than 54 percent of discharge recommendations. Civil or police involvement was overwhelmingly the reason for recruits receiving waivers (Code "B") or local action (Code "C"). In the first half of FY 1999, drug history accounted for almost 42 percent of discharge recommendations, while civil/police involvement was the most frequent type of recruit admission in all Action Code groups.

To summarize this section of the chapter, analysis of MOT recruits by RQAT Action Code indicates that men are concentrated in categories "A" (recommended for discharge) and "B" (formal waiver required). Women are concentrated in category "C" (local action). MOT recruits who are not high school graduates—whether they have college, a GED, or an alternate education credential—tend to be over—

represented among MOT recruits when compared with all Navy recruits. Minorities do not appear to be disproportionately represented among MOT recruits. There are relatively few MOT recruits in AFQT Category I, and these tend not to be in the RQAT Action Code "A" group. Recruits in AFQT Categories IIIA and IIIB are somewhat over-represented in both Action Code "A" and "B." Persons with an enlistment waiver account for about half of all MOT recruits. Moral and other, non-medical waivers are over-represented among MOT recruits recommended for discharge. Newly disclosed history of prior civil/police involvement or drug use is the most common reason for recommending discharge, and people with such history comprise more than three-quarters of all MOT recruits.

C. COMPARISON OF SEPARATION RATES AND INTER-SERVICE SEPARATION CODES OF "MOMENT OF TRUTH" RECRUITS AND ALL ACCESSIONS

This section examines observed differences in early separation rates between FY 1998 and FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" recruits and total Navy accessions, as well as Inter-Service Separation Codes (ISCs) associated with the two groups after certain periods of service. Two-month separation rates, by groups of ISCs, are compared for both cohorts, with an additional, six-month comparison for the FY 1998 MOT cohort. A six-month comparison could not be

completed for the FY 1999 cohort due to the recency of the MOT data. Appendix C explains the ISC groupings used in the tables that follow. These groupings were created by the author for this study.

Table 26 compares the active duty status of FY 1998

MOT recruits and all recruits after two months of service.

The most striking observation is that, after two months of service, basically just enough time to finish "boot camp," only 69.7 percent of MOT recruits remain on active duty, compared with 89.4 percent of all FY 1998 recruits. Every discharge category except "Performance" shows a similar dramatic difference, with discharge percentage rates approaching three times higher for MOT recruits than for all recruits in some discharge categories. The "Other"

Table 26. Active Duty Status of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" (MOT) Recruits and All Navy Recruits After Two Months of Service

	MOT		All Recruits	
Status	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Active	3,973	69.7	38,483	89.4
Discharged				
Drug/Alcohol	151	2.6	347	0.8
Legal	360	6.3	981	2.3
Medical	286	5.0	976	2.3
Performance	15	0.3	97	0.2
Psychological	332	5.8	778	1.8
Other	588	10.3	1,366	3.2
Total	5,705	100.0	43,028	100.0

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

discharge category, one of those with a roughly threefold rate for MOT recruits, includes such reasons as "Dependency or Hardship" (for example, a recruit unable to support his or her dependents), various "Early Release" categories, "Pregnancy," and "Conscientious Objector." (Refer to Appendix C for the full list of ISC groupings.)

Table 27. Active Duty Status of FY 1998 "Moment of Truth" Recruits and All Navy Recruits After Six Months of Service

	MOT		All Recruits	
Status	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Active	3,826	67.1	37,937	88.2
Discharged				
Drug/Alcohol	162	2.8	392	0.9
Legal	387	6.8	1,094	2.5
Medical	324	5.7	1,102	2.6
Performance	39	0.7	192	0.4
Psychological	360	6.3	863	2.0
Other	607	10.6	1,448	3.4
TOTAL	5,705	100.0	43,028	100.0

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

Table 27 compares six-month discharge rates for MOT recruits with those for all FY 1998 recruits. As seen here, the discharge rates for MOT recruits tend to be up to three-times higher than for recruits as a whole.

"Performance" is, again, the sole category showing only a slight difference between MOT recruits and all recruits.

Table 28 shows discharge rates and categories for MOT recruits and all recruits who entered in FY 1999, after two months of service. Again, MOT recruits have discharge

rates that are two- to three-times higher than recruits as a whole in all categories except "Performance." A six-month comparison could not be accomplished due to the fact that six months had not elapsed from the end of the MOT data to the date of this study's completion (August 1999).

Table 28. Active Duty Status of FY 1999 "Moment of Truth" Recruits and All Navy Recruits After Two Months of Service*

	MOT		All Recruits	
Status	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Active	1,518	64.0	15,130	83.6
Discharged				
Drug/Alcohol	153	6.5	452	2.5
Legal	197	8.3	607	3.4
Medical	119	5.0	599	3.3
Performance	0	0.0	9	0.0
Psychological	92	3.9	204	1.1
Other	292	12.3	1,101	6.1
TOTAL	2,371	100.0	18,102	100.0

*Includes October 1998 through March 1999.

Source: Special database derived from information provided by Defense Manpower Data Center and Recruit Quality Assurance Team.

To summarize this section of the chapter, MOT recruits tend to have discharge rates that are two- to three-times higher than those of all recruits during corresponding periods, both at the two-month point (FY 1998, FY 1999) and six-month point (FY 1998). While almost 90 percent of all FY 1998 recruits, and about 84 percent of all FY 1999 recruits, remain on active duty after two months, barely two-thirds of MOT recruits are still in service at that point in time. MOT recruits in both years have higher

discharge rates for drug and alcohol incidents, legal, psychological, and medical problems, and "other" reasons.

VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

This thesis examines information on Navy recruits that may render them unable to continue their enlisted service.

The information comes to light as a result of the

Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) Recruit Quality

Assurance Team (RQAT) program, informally called the

"Moment of Truth," which asks recruits to reveal possible problems that may have been concealed during enlistment processing.

A total of 8,076 RQAT recruit records were analyzed to identify the demographic characteristics of recruits and their educational qualifications, and the general type of information revealed. Categories of RQAT actions were enumerated, including recommendations for discharge or for continued service by formal waiver or local-level documentation. Discharge rates of "Moment of Truth" recruits were also compared with those of all Navy recruits during corresponding time periods.

The results indicate that "Moment of Truth" recruits are slightly more likely to be male and white than the average Navy recruit. MOT recruits, overall, are more likely than the typical recruit to have some educational

qualification other than a regular high school diploma (such as college experience, a GED, or an alternate education credential). MOT recruits are reasonably representative of racial/ethnic groups in general when compared with all Navy recruits. No clear conclusions can be drawn about the distribution of MOT recruits by AFQT category, which fluctuated between the two years of data examined.

Most MOT recruits continue their naval service immediately following the "Moment of Truth." In FY 1998, about 5 percent of MOT recruits were recommended for discharge after revealing a problem. In the first six months of FY 1999, in a sample about half the size of FY 1998, discharge recommendations rose to 9.5 percent. More than 90 percent of the discharge recommendations in both years were a result of recruits disclosing past drug use or a history of civil/police involvement.

Civil/police involvement accounts for roughly twothirds of all MOT recruit admissions. Drug use admissions
constitute more than 11 percent of FY 1998 admissions and
8.8 percent of FY 1999 admissions (first six months). MOT
recruits who admitted to drug use were less likely to
receive a waiver than were recruits who admitted to other
problems. Medical conditions account for about 17 percent

of admissions, but generated no discharge recommendations or waivers during the time period covered in the study.

The remainder of recruit admissions, about 5 percent each year, are categorized as "other."

Finally, although only about 5 percent of MOT recruits are recommended for immediate discharge, the two- and sixmonth discharge rates for these recruits greatly exceed the rates for all recruits. After just two months, 69.7 percent of FY 1998 MOT recruits remained on active duty, compared with 89.4 percent of all recruits. After six months of service, 67.1 percent of FY 1998 MOT recruits were still on active duty, compared with 88.2 percent of all recruits. In the first six months of FY 1999, only 64 percent of MOT recruits were still on active duty after two months, compared with 83.6 percent of all recruits. figures indicate a substantial increase in the risk of early attrition for MOT recruits, when compared with all Navy recruits. Specifically, MOT recruits in both years had discharge rates two- to three-times higher than did recruits on the whole for drug and alcohol incidents, legal, psychological, and medical problems, and "other" reasons.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The Recruit Quality Assurance Team is performing a valuable function for the Navy. RQAT members listen to the stories told by thousands of recruits each year, and find about 5 percent of these recruits ineligible to serve in the Navy. Based on RQAT historical data, more than 90 percent of recruits discharged under MOT will have either a serious criminal offense or serious drug use in their past, and should have been disqualified from enlisting in the first place. Without the RQAT, these recruits would have entered the Navy system and would have been at risk to become early losses. In the worst case, one or more of these recruits may have resumed criminal or drug activity, and ended up hurting or killing a shipmate or a civilian.

The data also show that "Moment of Truth" recruits who meet CNRC enlistment eligibility requirements, and receive a formal waiver or some form of local documentation action, tend to have a significantly higher rate of first-term attrition than do recruits as a whole. This higher early attrition is evident at both the two-month and six-month points. The data suggest that there is something about MOT recruits that puts them at higher risk for early attrition. This is consistent with earlier studies that found recruits with previous criminal histories to be at greater risk for

first-term attrition, for example, Flyer (1995), Frabutt (1996), and Bohn and Schmitz (1996).

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made as a result of the information presented in this study:

- 1. Prior to making any changes to the RQAT program, careful consideration should be given to the potential effect on eliciting information from recruits.

 Notwithstanding concerns for "kinder, gentler" appearances and recruit "self-esteem," the RQAT's professional, forceful, and direct approach has evidently produced results that benefit the Navy. The Navy should use the RQAT to its fullest advantage in identifying unqualified or questionably qualified recruits.
- 2. A comparison of the numbers of recruit admissions before and after the May 1999 alterations to the RQAT program should be performed at the end of FY 1999. If the more temperate approach is producing fewer recruit admissions, consideration should be given to restoring a little more "healthy apprehension" to the RQAT presentation.
- 3. An annual follow-up study similar to that performed here should be undertaken. Annual studies

would help identify trends in the categories of recruit admissions and the disposition of the recruits, as well as reveal the long-term outcomes with respect to attrition or later performance in service.

4. Enlisted Program Officers, recruiting station commanders, and MEPS commanders and operations officers should become familiar with the RQAT and its operations. Enlisted fleet recruiters already visit the RQAT as part of a tour of RTC at least once during their recruiting tour. A member of the RQAT could provide briefings at individual recruiting sites and MEPS, or at recruiting and MEPS conferences where a large number of officer personnel would be present.

APPENDIX A. INTER-SERVICE SEPARATION CODES (ISC)

Code	Reason
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Unknown or Invalid Expiration of Term of Service Early Release - Insufficient Retainability Early Release - To Attend School Early Release - Police Duty Early Release - In the National Interest Early Release - Seasonal Employment Early Release - To Teach Early Release - Other
10 11 12 13 14 15 16	Conditions Existing Prior to Service (EPTS) Disability - Severance Pay Permanent Disability - Retired Temporary Disability - Retired Disability - Non EPTS - No Severance Pay Disability - Title 10 Retirement Unqualified for Active Duty - Other Failure to Meet Weight/Body Fat Standards
22	Dependency or Hardship
30 31 32 33	Battle Casualty Non-Battle - Disease Non-Battle - Other Death - Cause not specified
40 41 42	Officer Commissioning Program Warrant Officer Program Service Academy
50 51 52	20 - 30 Years of Service Over 30 Years of Service Other Categories

60 61 62	Character or Behavior Disorder Motivational Problems (Apathy) Enuresis
63	Inaptitude
64	Alcoholism
65	Discreditable Incidents - Civilian or Military
66	Shirking
67	Drugs
68	Financial Irresponsibility
69	Lack of Dependent Support
70	Unsanitary Habits
71	Civil Court Conviction
72	Security
73	Court Martial
74	Fraudulent Entry
75	AWOL, Desertion
76	Homosexuality
77	Sexual Perversion
78	Good of the Service (in lieu of Court Martial)
79	Juvenile Offender
80	Misconduct (Reason Unknown)
81	Unfitness (Reason Unknown)
8.2	Unsuitability (Reason Unknown)
83	Pattern of Minor Disciplinary Infractions
84	Commission of a Serious Offense
85	Failure to Meet Minimum Qualifications for Retention
86	Expeditious Discharge/Unsatisfactory Performance
87	Trainee Discharge/Entry Level Performance and
	Conduct
90	Secretarial Authority
91	Erroneous Enlistment or Induction
92	Sole Surviving Family Member
93	Marriage
94	Pregnancy
95	Underage (Minor)
96	Conscientious Objector
97	Parenthood
98	Breach of Contract
99	Other

- 100 Immediate Reenlistment
- 101 Dropped from Strength for Desertion
- 102 Dropped from Strength for Imprisonment
- 103 Record Correction
- 104 Dropped from Strength as MIA/POW
- 105 Other Dropped from Strength/the Rolls

Source: DMDC Active Duty Military Master and Loss Edit Documentation, August 1992, pp. B-2 - B-4.

APPENDIX B. ENLISTMENT WAIVER CODES

Code	Reason
0 1	Not Applicable (No Waiver) Age
2	Number of Dependents
3	Mental Qualification
4	Moral Qualification
5	Previous disqualification separation
6	Lost Time
7	Physical Qualification (Existed Prior to Service, EPTS)
8	Physical Qualification
9	Sole Survivor Member
10	Education
11	Alien
12	Security Risk
13	Conscientious Objector
14	Pay Grade
15	Skill Requirements
16	Predictor Requirements
. 17	Other

Source: DMDC Active Duty Military Master and Loss Edit Documentation, August 1992, p. 25.

APPENDIX C. INTER-SERVICE SEPARATION CODE GROUPINGS

MEDICAL

- 10 Conditions Existing Prior to Service (EPTS)
- 11 Disability Severance Pay
- 12 Permanent Disability Retired
- 13 Temporary Disability Retired
- 14 Disability Non EPTS No Severance Pay
- 15 Disability Title 10 Retirement
- 16 Unqualified for Active Duty Other
- 17 Failure to Meet Weight/Body Fat Standards

PSYCHOLOGICAL

- 60 Character or Behavior Disorder
- 61 Motivational Problems (Apathy)
- 62 Enuresis
- 63 Inaptitude

DRUGS/ALCOHOL

- 64 Alcoholism
- 67 Drugs

FINANCIAL

- 68 Financial Irresponsibility
- 69 Lack of Dependent Support

LEGAL

- 71 Civil Court Conviction
- 72 Security
- 73 Court Martial
- 74 Fraudulent Entry
- 75 AWOL, Desertion
- 76 Homosexuality
- 77 Sexual Perversion
- Good of the Service (in lieu of Court Martial)
- 79 Juvenile Offender

LEGAL continued

- 80 Misconduct (Reason Unknown)
- 81 Unfitness (Reason Unknown)
- 82 Unsuitability (Reason Unknown)
- 83 Pattern of Minor Disciplinary Infractions
- 84 Commission of a Serious Offense
- 106 Dropped from Strength for Desertion
- 107 Dropped from Strength for Imprisonment
- 108 Record Correction
- 109 Dropped from Strength as MIA/POW
- 110 Other Dropped from Strength/the Rolls

PERFORMANCE

- 65 Discreditable Incidents Civilian or Military
- 66 Shirking
- 85 Failure to Meet Minimum Qualifications for Retention
- 86 Expeditious Discharge/Unsatisfactory Performance
- 87 Trainee Discharge/Entry Level Performance and Conduct

OTHER

- 2 Early Release Insufficient Retainability
- 3 Early Release To Attend School
- 4 Early Release Police Duty
- 5 Early Release In the National Interest
- 6 Early Release Seasonal Employment
- 7 Early Release To Teach
- 8 Early Release Other
- 22 Dependency or Hardship
- 30 Battle Casualty
- 31 Non-Battle Disease
- 32 Non-Battle Other
- 33 Death Cause not specified
- 40 Officer Commissioning Program
- 41 Warrant Officer Program
- 42 Service Academy
- 70 Unsanitary Habits

OTHER continued

- 90 Secretarial Authority
- 91 Erroneous Enlistment or Induction
- 92 Sole Surviving Family Member
- 93 Marriage
- 94 Pregnancy
- 95 Underage (Minor)
- 96 Conscientious Objector
- 97 Parenthood
- 98 Breach of Contract
- 99 Other

Source: DMDC Active Duty Military Master and Loss Edit Documentation, August 1992, pp. B-2 - B-4.

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